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I. INTRODUCTION
In his classic novel, Animal Farm, George Orwell wrote, “All animals
are equal, but some animals are more equal than others.”1 Orwell’s Animal
Farm offers insight on the human tendency to create a class system within an
alleged equal and classless system. Such is the U.S. Department of
Corrections. In a system where all prisoners are equal, some prisoners are
more equal than others.
How many transgender persons are currently living in the United
States? The simple answer: no one is quite sure.2 Based on what limited data
is available, the National Center for Transgender Equality asserts that
between 0.25% and 1% of the U.S. population is transsexual.3 Scholars in
transgender studies estimate that 1 in 30,000 adult males seek sex
reassignment surgery.4 This Article will explore a controversial holding of a
U.S. District Court regarding transgender prisoner rights. Issues such as
transgender rights are no longer stifled by the law, but rather are finally being
heard.
In Kosilek v. Spencer (Kosilek II), the U.S. District Court for the District
of Massachusetts ordered an injunction for sex reassignment surgery for the
very first time.5 Michelle Kosilek, a transgender inmate with severe gender
identity disorder (GID), initially brought suit in Kosilek v. Maloney (Kosilek
I) seeking hormone therapy and sex reassignment surgery.6 In Kosilek I, his
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claim was denied based on an inability to meet every element of his Eighth
Amendment claim.7 Kosilek was successful in Kosilek II, but the legal
implications of the District Court’s order are still unclear.
This Note will argue that Kosilek II opens the door for transgender
prisoner rights because the U.S. District Court correctly took such a strong,
although limited, stance on sex reassignment surgery for transgender
prisoners. Section II explores prior transgender prisoner litigation;
particularly Kosilek I. Section III discusses the facts and findings of the
District Court in Kosilek v. Spencer. Finally, Section IV will analyze three
controversial aspects of this case by predicting the future implications of this
controversial holding on upcoming transgender prisoner litigation,
considering the Department of Correction’s oppressive policies, and
evaluating whether such a holding is a reasonable use of taxpayer dollars.
Due to the severity of Kosilek’s gender identity disorder and the need for
social reform, the District Court came to the appropriate conclusion in
Kosilek v. Spencer.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Until recently, issues regarding transgender rights were dodged by both
circuit and district courts. Given that law-abiding transgender rights were
not considered, transgender prisoner rights certainly were not making their
way through the judicial system. In Farmer v. Brennan, the U.S. Supreme
Court heard a transgender prisoner rights case for the first time.8 The Court
described a transsexual as a person who has ‘“[a] rare psychiatric disorder in
which a person feels persistently uncomfortable about his or her anatomical
sex,’ and who typically seeks medical treatment, including hormone therapy
and surgery, to bring about a permanent sex change.”9 Prisoner treatment
and prison conditions, including treatment of transsexual persons, are subject
to evaluation under the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual
punishment.10 Farmer further laid out the standard for injunctive relief for
evaluating such treatment, which the district court later applied in Kosilek I
and II.11 In considering injunctive relief, courts must consider the “attitudes
and conduct” of prison staff at the time of the litigation and make inferences
into their attitudes once the suit has commenced.12
To fully understand the holding of Kosilek II, an in depth analysis of
Kosilek I is necessary. For purposes of this Article, Kosilek will be referred
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to as “he,” consistent with the district court opinion.13 In Kosilek I, Kosilek
brought suit against the Massachusetts Department of Corrections (DOC)
Commissioner, Maloney, regarding deliberate indifference to a serious
medical need and inadequate medical care, but his claim was ultimately
dismissed by the district court.14 However, in dicta, the Kosilek I court made
many important statements that came to light in Kosilek II.15
In Kosilek I, Plaintiff Michelle Kosilek brought his first claim alleging
deliberate indifference to his serious medical need and inadequate medical
care from the DOC.16 Kosilek is currently serving a life sentence for the
murder of his wife.17 Kosilek suffers from GID, which causes him extreme
mental anguish, as he feels that he is a woman “cruelly trapped” in a man’s
body.18
Kosilek’s mother abandoned him at an orphanage at the age of three,
where he was often reprimanded and punished for wearing female clothing.19
He was later reunited with his mother but was then frequently raped by his
grandfather.20 When Kosilek expressed a longing to live life as a female, his
stepfather stabbed him.21 In response to these horrors, Kosilek fled home and
took on a female persona, soon falling into a life of drugs and prostitution.22
For roughly a year, Kosilek received illegal prescription estrogen hormone
treatments in exchange for sex.23 After getting his college degree, Kosilek
relapsed back into drug use, and sought treatment at a rehabilitation facility.24
During his stint in rehab, Kosilek met Cheryl McCaul, a volunteer
counselor.25 McCaul advised Kosilek that his transsexualism “would be
cured by a good woman,” and the two got married.26 Kosilek murdered
McCaul in 1990.27 At his trial, Kosilek claimed self-defense because McCaul
poured boiling tea on his genitals.28
While awaiting trial, Kosilek took birth control pills that were illegally
provided to him by a prison guard.29 During that time, Kosilek attempted
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suicide twice, and he once tried to castrate himself.30 Upon his conviction,
Kosilek went to the DOC to serve his sentence of life imprisonment without
the possibility of parole.31
While incarcerated, Kosilek met with many psychologists, most of
whom had no background with gender identity disorder patients.32 However,
the World Professional Association for Transgender Health (WPATH)
created the Standards of Care, which exists to “provide clinical guidance for
health professionals to assist transsexual, transgender, and gender
nonconforming people with safe and effective pathways to achieving lasting
personal comfort with their gendered selves, in order to maximize their
overall health, psychological well-being, and self-fulfillment.”33
As explained by the court, “The Standards of Care establish a ‘triadic
treatment sequence.’ This triadic sequence is comprised of: (1) hormone
therapy; (2) a real-life experience of living as a member of the opposite sex;
and (3) sex reassignment surgery.”34 The Standards of Care promote the use
of hormone therapy as a way to improve quality of life and diminish
depression and suicidal thoughts in those that suffer from GID.35
The Standards of Care expressly address hormone therapy for
incarcerated inmates.36 It provides that inmates who were previously
prescribed hormone therapy for GID should continue to receive that
treatment during their incarceration.37 The Standards of Care also
specifically address sex reassignment surgery, providing that sex
reassignment surgery is, in some cases, “medically indicated and medically
necessary” and “constitutes a very effective and appropriate treatment for
transsexualism or profound GID.”38
Kosilek demanded treatment for his severe GID from the DOC, and he
consistently claimed that he would commit suicide if treatment was not
provided to him.39 Given these threats and Kosilek’s history, the court
concluded that Kosilek did indeed have a serious medical disorder and was
suffering from extreme emotional distress.40
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In 2000, DOC Commissioner Maloney, a defendant in the initial suit,
adopted a freezing policy regarding the treatment of transgender prisoners in
the DOC.41 This policy froze transsexual prisoners by only providing
hormone therapy to prisoners for whom it was prescribed prior to
incarceration.42 Since Kosilek never had a valid prescription for hormones,
this policy made it impossible for Kosilek to receive hormone therapy.43
In meetings regarding Kosilek, Maloney frequently expressed his
opinion that sex reassignment surgery or hormone therapy was not an
appropriate use of taxpayer dollars.44 Further, Maloney expressed security
concerns, particularly because Kosilek’s facility had a high number of sex
offenders.45 DOC doctors indicated that a medical decision was not made,
but rather an administrative decision was made, which banned treatment for
transgender prisoners.46
In response to Kosilek’s complaint, Maloney moved to dismiss all
claims against him.47 The court partially granted this motion but denied one
claim.48 As a result, the only claim considered in Kosilek I was whether
Kosilek was entitled to injunctive relief due to Maloney’s violation of
Kosilek’s rights under the Eighth Amendment.49
The Eighth Amendment bans the infliction of cruel and unusual
punishment and prohibits the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain on
an inmate.50 Prison officials have a duty to ensure that inmates have access
to adequate medical care.51 To prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim, a
plaintiff prisoner must establish deliberate indifference to a serious medical
need that violates “evolving standards of decency.”52
To have a valid claim for deliberate indifference, both a subjective and
an objective component must be met.53 To meet the objective prong, the
prisoner must show by a preponderance of the evidence that he has a serious
41.
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medical need that has not been adequately treated.54 A serious medical need
may be found in one of two ways: diagnosis by a licensed physician or a
medical need that is so obvious that an average person would know it needs
the attention of a physician.55 Further, the Eighth Amendment requires that
these medical decisions be considered on a case-by-case basis rather than by
general prison policy.56
In rendering judgments regarding the medical care provided to inmates,
the court must base its decisions on medical considerations.57 Also relevant
to deliberate indifference claims are “the realities of prison administration.”58
These realities include guaranteeing safety of both inmates and prison staff.59
However, these security concerns must be legitimate and justified, and
“concern for controversy is not a constitutionally permissible basis for
denying an inmate necessary medical care.”60
In applying these standards, the district court noted that Kosilek needed
to prove four elements to prevail on his Eighth Amendment claim: “(1) he
had a serious medical need; (2) which had not been adequately treated; (3)
because of Maloney's deliberate indifference; and (4) that deliberate
indifference was likely to continue in the future.”61
First, the court found that Kosilek did have a serious medical need.62
Neither party disputed Kosilek’s GID.63 However, GID alone is not enough
to establish a serious medical need, so the court considered Kosilek’s history
of depression, suicide attempts, and extreme mental anguish in finding that
he had a serious medical need.64 In light of Kosilek’s history, the court found
that Kosilek had a serious medical need.65
Next, the court held that Kosilek was not given adequate medical
treatment.66 Although some therapy and counseling was offered to Kosilek,
the court noted that physicians specializing in GID issues never examined
Kosilek to determine what treatment was necessary to treat his severe GID.67
Further, the DOC policy and guidelines precluded the possibility that Kosilek
could ever receive hormone therapy because they banned certain types of
54.
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treatments that Kosilek would have greatly benefitted from, including sex
reassignment surgery.68 The court decided that counseling alone was not
enough given the severity of Kosilek’s condition, and therefore, Kosilek was
denied adequate medical treatment.69 The court found, due to the DOC’s
freezing policy, that Kosilek never had an appropriate medical evaluation
while incarcerated in the DOC, thus rendering the undisputed treatment of
his serious medical need inadequate.70
Although Kosilek met the first two elements of his cruel and unusual
punishment claim, the latter two elements were not met.71 The court
determined that commissioner Maloney did not act with deliberate
indifference toward Kosilek for a variety of reasons.72 In its reasoning, the
court noted that Maloney’s actions were “rooted in sincere security concerns
. . . in a fear of public and political criticism[,] . . . [and] concern[] that any
expenditure for hormones or sex reassignment surgery might be an
inappropriate use of taxpayers’ money.”73 Additionally, and importantly,
Maloney was not a medical professional, but his lack of understanding about
the medical needs of Kosilek was acceptable to the court.74
The court believed that Maloney would not continue to be indifferent
to the medical needs of Kosilek.75 “The court expects that, educated by the
trial record and this decision, Maloney and his colleagues will in the future
attempt to discharge properly their constitutional duties to Kosilek.”76
Further, the court noted that its decision put Maloney on notice of issues with
transgender inmates and instructed how to handle those inmates in the
future.77
Kosilek also raised concern about the freezing policy of the DOC, but
the court said that the policy was sufficient.78 However, “decisions as to
whether psychotherapy, hormones, and/or sex reassignment surgery are
necessary to treat Kosilek adequately must be based on an ‘individualized
medical evaluation’ of Kosilek rather than as ‘a result of a blanket rule.’”79
Although the court entered a judgment for Maloney, the court made
many statements that shed light on its policy opinions.80 First, the court noted
that Kosilek should receive counseling from someone trained and well68.
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versed in dealing with GID patients, rather than doctors who have never
encountered GID.81 Second, if psychotherapy is not enough, the court
encouraged treatment by pharmaceutical therapy.82 Further, the court
acknowledged that these considerations may be trumped by the DOC’s
concerns for safety, if properly pled.83 However, the court noted that Kosilek
already lived as a female in a male prison population, and thus far it had
posed no security issues.84 Although a judgment was entered for Maloney,
the district court soon heard again from Michelle Kosilek.85
III. EXPOSITION OF THE CASE
Unfortunately, the DOC did not cooperate with Kosilek as the court had
wished in 2002.86 In Kosilek v. Spencer, Kosilek proved the DOC violated
his rights under the Eighth Amendment.87 Where Kosilek I dealt specifically
with hormone therapy, Kosilek II sought “an unprecedented court order
requiring that the defendant Commissioner of the Massachusetts Department
of Correction (the ‘DOC’) provide him with sex reassignment surgery to treat
his major mental illness, severe gender identity disorder.”88 While the issue
of sex reassignment surgery and prisoner’s rights had come before the court
prior to Kosilek I, this case differed significantly in that a DOC physician
prescribed sex reassignment surgery to Kosilek as the only means of treating
his illness.89
Notably, the court provided information on the aftermath of Kosilek I.90
Kosilek I was decided in August 2002, and by December 2002, the DOC
made significant changes to its freezing policy.91 Previously, the DOC’s
policy was to provide hormones to transgender inmates only if they had been
prescribed such prior to incarceration, but the new policy allowed for flexible
increases or decreases on a case-by-case basis.92
However, the
Commissioner and the Director of the Department’s Health Services
Division must approve any changes in prescriptions.93
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
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Id. at 194.
Id.
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Supp. 2d 228 (D. Mass. 2012); Brugliera v. Comm'r of Mass. Dep't of Corr., No. 07-40323, 2009
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131002 (D. Mass. Dec. 16, 2009); Kosilek I, 221 F. Supp. 2d 156 (D. Mass. 2002).
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In 2003, a GID specialist, Dr. David Seil, evaluated Kosilek.94 As a
result of his evaluation, Dr. Seil prescribed Kosilek estrogen therapy. 95
Regarding sex reassignment surgery, Dr. Seil recommended Kosilek be
treated with hormones for one year, and if they proved insufficient, then sex
reassignment would be necessary to treat Kosilek.96 In response to this future
recommendation, Maloney terminated Dr. Seil’s employment with the
DOC.97 However, Maloney and the DOC did provide Kosilek with estrogen
treatments beginning in August 2003, and Kosilek was allowed to wear
female undergarments.98 Then, in 2003, Kathleen Dennehy became the
commissioner of the DOC, and she was “determined not to be the first prison
official in the United States to authorize sex reassignment surgery for an
inmate.”99
In September 2004, Kosilek was to be evaluated for sex reassignment
surgery by a specialist from Fenway Community Health Center of
Massachusetts, a leading clinic in GID.100 Fearing a prescription of sex
reassignment surgery, Dennehy took an “unprecedented step” and had the
DOC find a specialist of its own to evaluate Kosilek.101
Given that some Fenway doctors were still in the process of providing
treatment to Kosilek, Fenway doctors continued to meet with Kosilek.102 In
a report from the Fenway doctors to the DOC, the doctors advised Dennehy
that Kosilek needed sex reassignment surgery and that if Kosilek did not
receive surgery, he was at a very high risk of suicide or self-harm.1036 In
response, the DOC hired Dr. Osborne, a heavily influenced colleague of a
former Vatican physician who was known for his view that sex reassignment
surgery is “religiously abhorrent.”104 The court found that the DOC hired
Osborne because it was foreseeable Osborne would deny sex reassignment
surgery given her Vatican background.105
Additionally, Dennehy continued to claim she did not know if Fenway
doctors recommended sex reassignment surgery.106 Dennehy still feigned
confusion despite the fact that she wrote a note to the Director of the Bureau
of Prisons, writing, “[o]ur medical providers[,] the Commonwealth’s medical
school, is supporting their consultant’s recommendation for the
94.
95.
96.
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99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
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surgery!!!!!!”107 Clearly, she was aware of the recommendation.108 For these
reasons, the court found that Dennehy knew that sex reassignment surgery
was the only available option to treat Kosilek’s severe GID.109
To obtain an injunction ordering sex reassignment surgery, Kosilek had
to prove the following,
(1) he ha[d] a serious medical need; (2) sex reassignment surgery was the
only adequate treatment for it; (3) the defendant [knew] that Kosilek was at
high risk of serious harm if he [did] not receive sex reassignment surgery;
(4) the defendant ha[d] not denied that treatment because of good faith,
reasonable security concerns or for any other legitimate penological
purpose; and (5) the defendant’s unconstitutional conduct [would] continue
in the future.110

Since Kosilek I, DOC doctors deemed sex reassignment surgery the
only adequate option to treat Kosilek, and a DOC specialist prescribed
Kosilek with sex reassignment surgery.111
In response to that
recommendation, DOC deputy commissioner Kathleen Dennehy participated
in efforts to have the specialist fired.112 Dennehy then became commissioner
of the DOC, and she failed to provide transgender inmates with prescription
hormone therapy.113 The DOC then hired Dr. Cynthia Osborne.114 Osborne
previously worked in the Johns Hopkins psychiatric department, which is
known for its strong views opposing sex reassignment surgery, believing that
no prisoner should ever need sex reassignment surgery.115 Osborne had
previously evaluated transgender prisoners and always found that sex
reassignment surgery was not necessary.116 Dennehy claimed that the DOC
did not hire Osborne because of her anti-sex reassignment surgery stance,
which the Court found to be a blatant lie.117
Kosilek, at the time of this Article, receives counseling and hormone
therapy.118 Dennehy indicated in 2006 that she was aware of the seriousness
of Kosilek’s medical condition, admitting she was on notice that sex
reassignment surgery may be the only adequate treatment for Kosilek. 119
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
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119.
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Id.
Id.
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Despite this knowledge, Dennehy indicated that “providing such treatment
would create insurmountable security problems[,]” and therefore, treatment
was denied for security reasons.120 Despite the alleged security concerns,
Dennehy did admit that Kosilek’s safety could be “reasonably assured” postsex reassignment surgery.121
In response, Kosilek suggested that security concerns merely cloaked
the true reason the DOC denied sex reassignment surgery, claiming they were
swayed by “a fear of controversy, criticism, ridicule, and scorn.”122 The
district court agreed and found the denial to be an Eighth Amendment
violation.123 While the court considered the fear of controversy was
understandable given the circumstances, the court held that such a fear does
not trump a prisoner’s right to be free from deliberate indifference under the
Eighth Amendment.124 The court held that denial of adequate medical care
for political reasons is “precisely the type of conduct the Eighth Amendment
prohibits.”125 Due to the political and controversial aspects of the case, the
court concluded that the DOC would continue to violate Kosilek’s rights
unless judicial action was taken.126
In light of these facts, the court ordered an injunction commanding the
DOC to provide Kosilek with the prescribed treatment of sex reassignment
surgery.127 In its reasoning, the court noted that GID should be treated just
as any other mental illness is treated.128 The applicable standards in this case
were precisely the same as in Kosilek I. Like Kosilek I, the court found that
Kosilek’s GID was an undisputed fact.129 However, the court had to
determine the “current” severity of Kosilek’s GID.130 The Court referred
back to the detailed facts surrounding Kosilek I,131 as explored in the previous
Section. In evaluating Kosilek’s current level of distress, the court found that
Kosilek’s risk of suicide or self-harm would significantly increase from an
already high level if sex reassignment surgery was denied.132
The court next determined that sex reassignment surgery was the only
adequate treatment for Kosilek’s severe GID.133 In considering the Standards
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of Care from Kosilek I,134 the court found that it had been well established by
the record that sex reassignment surgery is the only adequate treatment for
Kosilek, satisfying the objective element of the deliberate indifference test.135
Kosilek also satisfied the third element of his burden, proving the
subjective prong of the deliberate indifference test.136 To meet this burden,
Kosilek needed to prove that prison officials knew of and disregarded his
serious medical need.137 The court found that the record “clearly
establishe[d]” that DOC officials knew of the substantial risk of harm if
Kosilek was not adequately treated, given his previous attempts at suicide
and castration.138
Lastly, the court determined that the deliberate indifference of the DOC
would continue.139 In determining this, the court considered all of the
inappropriate actions and decisions on the part of the DOC aimed directly at
Kosilek and other transgender prisoners.140 Since all four elements (as listed
in the previous Section) were met, the court issued a rare and limited
injunction.141 The court noted that it would not decide where and who would
perform the surgery, nor would it determine where and how Kosilek would
be incarcerated post-surgery.142 Kosilek has yet to receive sex reassignment
surgery, as this decision is currently on appeal.143 Kosilek has, however,
received laser hair removal and continues to receive hormone therapy.144
IV. ANALYSIS
Issues surrounding transgender prisoner rights may seem few and far
between. While it is unclear exactly how many transgender persons are
currently incarcerated, studies show that transgender persons suffering from

134. “The Standards of Care ‘triadic sequence is comprised of: (1) hormone therapy; (2) a real-life
experience of living as a member of the opposite sex; and (3) sex reassignment surgery.” Kosilek I,
221 F. Supp. 2d 156, 166 (D. Mass. 2002). “Although the Standards of Care have been revised
somewhat since Kosilek I was decided in 2002, the prerequisites for complete sex reassignment
surgery remain the same.” Kosilek II, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 231.
135. Kosilek II, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 236.
136. Id. at 237.
137. Id. (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)).
138. Id. at 238.
139. Id. at 247.
140. Id. at 249; see also Battista v. Clarke, 645 F.3d 449, 455 (1st Cir. 2011).
141. Kosilek II, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 250.
142. Id.
143. Zack Ford, New York Times: Prisons Should ‘Do The Right Thing’ For Transgender Inmates,
THINK PROGRESS (Aug. 28, 2013, 10:28 AM), http://thinkprogress.org/lgbt/2013/08/28/2540421/
york-times-military-thing-chelsea-mannings-transgender-medical-care/.
144. JoNel Aleccia, Beginning Gender Change in Prison is a Long Shot, NBC NEWS (Aug. 22, 2013,
8:28 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/health/health-news/beginning-gender-change-prison-longshot-6C10974050.
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GID are more likely to end up in prison than average citizens.145 According
to the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force and the National Center for
Transgender Equality,
[Transgender persons] are more likely to interact with police because they
are more likely to be victims of violent crime, because they are more likely
to be on the street due to homelessness and/or being unwelcome at home,
because their circumstances often force them to work in the underground
economy, and even because many face harassment and arrest simply
because they are out in public while being transgender. 146

Kosilek’s case has received positive feedback from the LGBT
community and extremely critical feedback from others.147 While this case
is currently up on appeal, there is an online petition set in place by the family
of Kosilek’s deceased wife, pleading for a reversal of the decision.148 Other
forums have expressed support for the decision, which finally gives a voice
to transgender prisoners.149
A. Impact on Future Litigation
The controversial decision reached in Kosilek will have an impact on
upcoming transgender prisoner litigation. For example, in August 2013,
Private Bradley Manning was sentenced to thirty-five years in prison for
disclosing government secrets on the notorious website Wikileaks.150 While
the Manning case received mass media attention due to the sensitive national
security information spilled on Wikileaks, the Bradley Manning story took
an unexpected turn when Bradley expressed his desire to live as a female.151
After sentencing, Manning went on national television and said, “As I
145. Adrienne Lu, For Transgender Detainees, a Jail Policy Offers Some Security, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
23, 2011, at A25A; Cara Kulwicki, Transgender People and the Prison System, CURVATURE (Dec.
7, 2007), http://thecurvature.com/2007/12/07/transgender-people-and-the-prison-system/.
146. Lu, supra note 145 .
147. See Nathanial Penn, Should This Inmate Get a State-Financed Sex Change Operation? What We
Owe a Murderer, NEW REPUBLIC (Oct. 30, 2013), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/115335/
sex-change-prison-inmate-michelle-kosilek-should-we-pay; Akiba Solomon, We Can’t Afford to
Participate in a ‘Justice for Some’ Culture, COLORLINES (Sept. 24, 2012, 10:00 AM),
http://colorlines.com/archives/2012/09/online_and_in_life_we_simply_cant_afford_to_participate
_in_a_justice_for_some_culture.html.
148. Susan Johnson, Commonwealth of Massachusetts: Overturn Ruling on Taxpayer-Funded Sex
Change for Convicted Murderer, CHANGE.ORG, http://www.change.org/petitions/commonwealthof-massachusetts-overturn-ruling-on-taxpayer-funded-sex-change-for-convicted-murderer.
149. NCTE Joins Brief in Michelle Kosilek Case, ADVANCING TRANSGENDER EQUALITY (Mar. 4, 2013,
2:27 PM), http://transgenderequality.wordpress.com/2013/03/04/ncte-and-7-other-lgbt-groupsfile-brief-in-michelle-kosilek-case/.
150. Emmarie Huetteman, ‘I Am a Female,’ Manning Announces, Asking Army for Hormone Therapy,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2013, at A17.
151. Id.
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transition into this next phase of my life, I want everyone to know the real
me … I am Chelsea Manning. I am a female. Given the way that I feel, and
have felt since childhood, I want to begin hormone therapy as soon as
possible.”152 Although Manning’s situation is governed by military law, both
Kosilek cases will likely play a huge role in the upcoming litigation as
Manning seeks hormone therapy.
In considering what will happen to Manning and other transgender
prisoners, it is important to note the scope of the Kosilek holding is very
limited. What set Kosilek apart from previous transgender prisoner claims is
that Kosilek was prescribed both hormone therapy and sex reassignment
surgery by licensed DOC physicians. In Manning’s case, a mere desire to
have hormone therapy is not enough without a valid prescription from prison
medical staff. Such a prescription may not be easy to obtain. Additionally,
as other transgender prisoners try to use Kosilek as a means to receive
hormone therapy and sex reassignment surgery, they will likely hit the same
roadblock. The court’s narrow holding in Kosilek requires a prescription for
hormone therapy and sex reassignment surgery before an injunction may be
ordered.153
B. The DOC’s Blatant Discrimination
Additionally, the bizarre action on the part of the DOC in Kosilek II
played a huge role in the outcome of the case. The DOC’s freezing policy,
coupled with the bad faith behavior of high-level DOC employees, made a
big difference in Kosilek’s ability to prove the DOC had violated his rights
and would continue to do so. The DOC’s actions were so obviously
discriminatory and so obviously directed at Kosilek, that the court simply
could not ignore the DOC’s behavior. As future litigation arises, the DOC
may not be as blatantly discriminatory, which may shut the door for future
claims.
C. Theories of Punishment
In this case, the DOC was not able to show that significant security
concerns arose due to Kosilek’s request for sex reassignment surgery. Now
that this decision has come down, DOC officials may learn how to better
plead security issues in future litigation. The DOC may find a loophole
which indicates that deference should be given to security matters, such as

152. Id.
153. Kosilek II, 889 F. Supp. 2d 190, 248 (D. Mass. 2012).
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sexual violence by other prisoners in the facility,154 thus quashing
transgender prisoner rights claims as they continue to arise.
Furthermore, this case sheds light on the DOC’s harsh policies
regarding transgender prisoners. There are four theories of punishment
accepted by criminal law scholars: retribution, deterrence, incapacitation,
and rehabilitation.155 Retribution is punishment for its own sake, in that the
offender deserves to be punished for his or her wrongful conduct.156 This
provides justice for the victim, the victim’s family, and society as a whole.157
The theory of deterrence is that punishment for one’s crimes will deter not
only the criminal from committing future crimes, but will also deter others
from committing that crime, for fear of incurring the same punishment.158
Incapacitation is used to prevent crime from occurring, in that criminals
cannot continue to harm society if they are locked up.159 Finally,
rehabilitation is the theory that criminals in prison can engage in programs to
help prisoners learn skills in order to become active, positive members of
society.160 While rehabilitation efforts have previously been deemed
unsuccessful, recent studies show rehabilitation programs reduce the risk of
falling back into one’s old habits by about ten percent.161
Retribution, deterrence, and incapacitation are all present in Kosilek’s
case. Kosilek is being punished for punishment’s sake so as to provide some
means of justice for the victim’s family and society. As other potential
criminals see the life sentence imposed on Kosilek, they are likely deterred
from making the same poor choices that Kosilek made. Lastly, Kosilek is
incapacitated, as he has lost his liberty and will remain behind prison walls
until his death. While these first three theories of punishment are established,
the theory of rehabilitation is not as clear.
According to the Massachusetts DOC, one of its primary goals is to
“effect positive behavioral change in order to eliminate violence,
victimization and recidivism.”162 This displays a clear intent to promote
rehabilitation of prisoners within the DOC. However, given the abhorrent
behavior of DOC staff in Kosilek, it appears rehabilitation was never a goal
for the care of Kosilek. If the DOC, particularly Dennehy, took the necessary
steps to help Kosilek overcome his mental illness, the DOC could have
abided by its own mission statement to affect positive behavioral change in
154. See Richard Edney, To Keep Me Safe From Harm? Transgender Prisoners and the Experience of
Imprisonment, 9 DEAKIN L. REV. 327, 327–38 (2004).
155. JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 34–41 (5th ed. 2009).
156. Id. at 38–39.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 36–37.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 37–38.
161. Id. at 37.
162. MASS. DEP’T OF CORR., http://www.mass.gov/eopss/agencies/doc/ (last visited Oct. 2, 2014).
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Kosilek. Rather, because of the DOC’s policies, Kosilek had to sit and suffer
for years before any kind of intervention took place.
Critics may assert that Kosilek will serve a life sentence, so why
rehabilitate him? Rehabilitation through education and counseling may be
viewed as a human right, for rehabilitation is fundamental to human
dignity.163 As a practical matter, rehabilitation efforts to provide inmates
serving life sentences with opportunities to further their education and
receive counseling have positive effects on the prison system and society as
a whole.164 Scholars note that rehabilitation through education in the prison
system is actually a means to lower costs.165 Robert Worth, a scholar on the
prison system, asserts that,
Education may be the most effective way to lower prison costs [because]
‘[educational] programs keep prisoners busy, with less supervision than
you'd need otherwise. Especially with respect to certain types of prison
educational programs, you save money by hiring fewer officers in the short
run and reducing recidivism in the long run.’ 166

Additionally, rehabilitation is important for those serving life sentences
because there are still judicial and legislative remedies. Prisoners may still
file habeas corpus claims, or there may be a subsequent change in the law.
Those sentenced to life occasionally do return to society, and it is the duty of
the prison system to ensure that they will be properly acclimated.
Additionally appalling is that DOC officials specifically sought out
former Vatican physicians to treat Kosilek and other transgender inmates.167
While theories of punishment may include incarceration and retribution, the
Eighth Amendment specifically prohibits cruel and unusual punishment.
Bringing in Vatican trained officials, who are obviously against sex
reassignment surgery, and for the most part, against social reform for the
LBGT community in general, is a clear violation of Kosilek’s rights, which
the court strongly considered in rendering its judgment.168 The DOC’s
behavior in handling Kosilek’s medical issue goes against all of the theories
of punishment because there is no societal interest at stake in creating policies
and hiring physicians specifically aimed at denying Kosilek medical care.

163. See Tabitha Cohen, College-in-Prison for Inmates Serving Life Sentences, THE MORNINGSIDE
REVIEW, http://morningsidereview.org/essay/college-in-prison-for-inmates-serving-life-sentences/
(last visited Oct. 2, 2014).
164. Id.
165. See Robert Worth, A Model Prison, THE ATLANTIC, Nov. 1995, at 38.
166. Id. at 40, 42 (internal citations omitted).
167. Kosilek II, 889 F. Supp. 2d 190, 221 (D. Mass. 2012).
168. Furthermore, intentionally hiring Vatican oriented physicians solely for the purpose of
discriminating against transgender inmates could potentially violate the First Amendment’s
separation of church and state. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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D. Taxpayer Dollars
Finally, courts must consider whether sex reassignment surgery is a
reasonable use of taxpayer dollars. Given the Kosilek II holding, Kosilek is
now entitled to receive sex reassignment surgery, which will indeed be
funded by state tax dollars.169 The cost of sex reassignment surgery for one
person is anywhere from $12,000 to $30,000.170 Hormone therapy, which is
also paid by taxpayer dollars,171 costs about $200 per month per prisoner.172
However, as of 1995, the National Association of Attorneys General
indicated that inmate civil rights litigation costs the United States upwards of
eighty-one million dollars every year.173
Some people and politicians may argue that it is not fair for a
transgender prisoner to receive sex reassignment surgery while incarcerated,
while those of us with our liberty still intact would have to pay for it
ourselves. Even as we move towards universal health care, sex reassignment
surgery is likely not covered by either the Affordable Care Act or most
normal coverage insurance carriers.174 However, in a case as serious as
Kosilek’s, where his life and wellbeing are at stake, it is more responsible
financially to take care of his medical needs rather than to continue litigation.
In an article about Kosilek specifically, Zack Ford noted that,
“Ironically, the state has spent more than double fighting [Kosilek’s] lawsuit
than what her surgery would have cost in the first place.”175 Jeff Krehely,
Vice President for the LGBT Research and Communications Project, asserts
that providing transgender prisoners with appropriate medical care is the
fiscally responsible response.176 Massachusetts has spent over ten years
litigating claims regarding the medical care of Kosilek.177 In 2008, USA
Today reported that Massachusetts spent at least $52,000 on medical expert
testimony.178 This cost alone is at least twice as much as sex reassignment
surgery would have been in the first place.
169. Jess Bidgood, Massachusetts: Sex Change Is Ordered for Inmate, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2012, at
A19.
170. Aleccia, supra note 144.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. 141 CONG. REC. 26,548 (1995) (statement of Sen. Bob Dole).
174. Amanda Marcotte, Rep. Paul Broun Fears Obamacare Will Turn Him Female, SLATE (Apr. 9,
2013, 12:03 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/xx_factor/2013/04/09/rep_paul_broun_tells_voters_
obamacare_mandates_sex_change_operations.html.
175. Ford, supra note 143.
176. Jeff Krehely, Massachusetts Senate Candidates Fail To Understand Importance Of Funding
Transgender Health Services, THINK PROGRESS (Sept. 10, 2012, 10:45 AM),
http://thinkprogress.org/lgbt/2012/09/10/819091/massachusetts-senate-candidates-fail-tounderstand-importance-of-funding-transgender-health-services/.
177. Litigation for Kosilek I began in November of 2001 and continues today. See pleadings in Kosilek
I, 889 F. Supp. 2d 190 (D. Mass. 2012).
178. Associated Press, supra note 28.
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United States District Chief Judge Mark L. Wolf, who decided both
Kosilek I and Kosilek II, will award over $700,000 in legal fees to the
attorneys of Kosilek.179 Attorneys for Kosilek indicated that they would drop
the request if the DOC would simply comply with the court ordered
injunction, rather than continue to litigate Kosilek II through the appeal
process.180 According to Judge Wolf, “The repeated violation of
constitutional rights of prisoners. . . costs taxpayers money that is needed for
other purposes.”181 Given sex reassignment surgery costs between $7,000
and $50,000,182 the fiscally savvy choice seems apparent. Such funds could
be much better used in another government program or even as a means to
lower tax rates. Given the narrow criteria transgender prisoners need to attain
sex reassignment surgery, taxpayer dollars are much better spent in providing
for their requested and needed medical care than to continue endless,
expensive litigation. As litigation relating to Kosilek continues to this day,
the State continues to cash out more and more taxpayer dollars for a problem
that could have been solved long ago.
V. CONCLUSION
The U.S. District Court properly ordered an injunction requiring sex
reassignment surgery for Kosilek. Given the specific facts and abhorrent
policies of the DOC in this case, the district court made the correct decision
in providing Kosilek with much needed medical care for his severe GID.
This holding was extremely narrow, and, therefore, will likely not open the
floodgates for future litigation. However, Kosilek II will be heavily relied
upon as transgender prisoners seek sex reassignment surgery in the future.
Further, it is clear from the case that the DOC did not abide by its own policy
of rehabilitation. Hopefully, the DOC, both in Massachusetts and elsewhere,
will learn from its now criticized policies and change its standards. Finally,
given statistical data, it is clear that sex reassignment surgery is not an
unreasonable use of taxpayer dollars, given the enormous costs of litigating
cases such as Kosilek I and II. In evaluating this case from an objective, yet
humane, point of view, it is clear that Kosilek has a significant medical need,
and fortunately, the court set politics aside and addressed that issue
appropriately. While this is a polarizing issue, many people lose sight of the
fact that although these men and women are incarcerated for serious crimes,
they are still people, just like the rest of us. Everyone has a right to receive
medical care and to be free from cruel punishments, even the criminally
179. Milton J. Valencia, Kosilek’s Lawyers to be Paid $700,000, BOSTON GLOBE (Dec. 19, 2012),
http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2012/12/19/ kosilek/4J0TDzj0U5SfJvEPU97J4I/story.html.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
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convicted. In a system where transgendered prisoners are often overlooked,
the Kosilek cases show that our courts are making an effort to ensure that all
prisoners are equal.

